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I    IntroductIon 
In September 2014 the then Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 
Pravin Gordhan, divided municipalities into three groups: a third of the municipalities was 
carrying out their tasks adequately, a third was just managing, and the last  third was 
‘frankly  dysfunctional’ because of  poor governance, inadequate financial management, 
and poor accountability mechanisms.1 What this analysis starkly illustrates is that local 
government cannot be seen as a uniform institution, operating in the same manner, 
facing the same challenges. Most, but not all metropolitan municipalities are highly 
functional and the same applies to the so-called ‘secondary cities’. Then there are highly 
dysfunctional rural municipalities but also rural municipalities that perform well. Yet a 
uniform system of law applies to them all. 
 
Within the context of a both performing and failing local state, the Constitutional Court had to 
confront some key issues about local governance during 2013. First, in Lagoonbay2 the Court 
had to respond to the claim for the empowerment of municipalities with respect to 
planning responsibilities. Second, in Liebenberg NO v Bergrivier Municipality3 and 
eThekwini Municipality v Ingonyama Trust4 the Court had to entertain challenges with 
regard to the municipal power to levy and collect property rates and the quest for financial 
sustainability. Third, in Brittania Beach v Saldanha Bay Municipality5 and Rademan v 
Moqhaka Municipality6 the Court was confronted by efforts of residents to hold their 
municipalities to account. In Rademan the municipality could fairly be described as 
‘frankly dysfunctional’. We will argue that the Constitutional Court was more than willing 
to assert the municipal domain of governance. Further, the Court was willing to condone less 
than perfect rule-compliant tax collection, thereby accommodating – to some extent – 
weak municipal administrations. Finally, the Court skirted around the problem of 
                                                          
1  Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Back to Basics: Serving our Communities Better! (2014), available at 
http://www.cogta.gov.za/summit2014/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/LG-Back-to-Basics-Approach-Document.pdf (‘Back to Basics’). 
2  Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate 
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5 Britannia Beach Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others v Saldanha Bay Municipality [2013] ZACC 30, 2013 (11) BCLR 1217 (CC)(‘Brittania 
Beach’). 
6 Rademan v Moqhaka Local Municipality and Others [2013] ZACC 11, 2013 (4) SA 225 (CC), 2013 (7) BCLR 791 (CC)(‘Rademan’). 
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dysfunctionality and the legal remedies that desperate residents lack who cannot hold their 
municipalities to account. 
 
II   context 
The establishment of the new local government regime in December 2000 has not resulted in 
meeting the goals of ‘developmental local government’, as articulated in the 1998 White 
Paper on Local Government.7 Some of the outcomes of developmental local government 
were identified as the provision of household infrastructure and services and the creation 
of liveable, integrated cities, towns and rural areas.8 
 
By 2009 many, but not all, local governments were showing clear signs of distress and 
some of outright dysfunctionality. Outward manifestations of this state of affairs included: 
the ever increasing civil society protests against poor service delivery in both urban and 
rural areas;9 the withholding of rates in some rural municipalities;10 the rising number of 
provincial interventions in terms of s 139 of the Constitution;11 the issuing of disclaimers, 
adverse and qualified audit reports by the Auditor-General for the majority of 
municipalities because of their poor financial management;12 and a plethora of court cases 
and reports on maladministration, corruption and fraud in the procurement of goods and 
services. 
 
The poor state of health of local government was widely acknowledged from both inside and 
outside of government. In 2009 the Department of Cooperative Government and 
Traditional Affairs conducted an assessment of each of the 283 municipalities in the nine 
provinces with the aim of identifying the root causes for poor performance, distress or 
dysfunctionality in municipalities.13 The resultant Report stated that: 
 
[p]rovincial assessments exposed that causal reasons for distress in municipal governance 
pointed to: 
a) tensions between the political and administrative interface; 
b) poor ability of many councillors to deal with the demands of local government; 
c) insufficient separation of powers between political parties and municipal councils; 
d) lack of clear separation between the legislative and executive; [sic] 
e) inadequate accountability measures and support systems and resources for  local 
f) democracy; and 
                                                          
7 White Paper on Local Government, Government Gazette 18739, General Notice 423 (13 March 1998). 
8 Ibid at 22. 
9 D Powell, M O’Donovan & J de Visser Civic Protest Barometer (2015), available at http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/our-
focus/mlgi/civic-protests-barometer-2007-2014/at_download/file. 
10 D Powell, J de Visser, A May & P Ntliziywana ‘The Withholding of Rates and Taxes in Five Municipalities’ (2010) 12(4) Local 
Government Bulletin 9. 
11 D Powell, M O’Donovan, Z Ayele & T Chigwata Municipal Audit Consistency Barometer (2013), available at 
http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/our-focus/mlgi/municipal-audit-consistency-barometer/at_ download/file. 
12 D Powell, M O’Donovan, Z Ayele & T Chigwata Operation Clean Audit 2014 – What Went Wrong And Why? (2013), available at 
http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/our-focus/mlgi/operation-clean-audit-2014. 
13 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report - 





g) poor compliance with the legislative and regulatory frameworks for municipalities.14 
 
The Report also identified the three main causes that prompted provincial inter- ventions in 
municipalities in terms of s 139 of the Constitution in the extreme cases where a 
municipality could not or did not fulfil its executive obligations:15 
 
The most common failures that have triggered s 139 provincial interventions fall into three 
broad categories: 
 
1. Governance: Political infighting, conflict between senior management and 
councillors and human resource management issues. 
2. Financial: Inadequate  revenue  collection,  ineffective  financial  systems, 
fraud, misuse of municipal assets and funds. 
3. Service delivery: Breach of sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution which 
outline service delivery obligations of municipalities. 
 
The important references for the purpose of this article are to ‘inadequate 
accountability measures and support systems and resources for local democracy’ and to the 
‘inadequate revenue collection, ineffective financial systems, fraud, misuse of municipal 
assets and funds’. On the one hand, municipalities collect too little revenue. On the other 
hand they too often squander what they have in the absence of adequate accountability 
measures. 
 
Five years later, as noted above, the assessment of local government by the new Minister 
Pravin Gordhan was no better. In a policy document, titled Back to Basics: Serving our 
Communities Better!, the Minister divided the 278 municipalities between the top third 
municipalities that have ‘got the basics right and are performing their functions at least 
adequately’ (mainly the metros and secondary cities), the middle third that are ‘fairly 
functional’ (rural towns), and the bottom third (mostly rural areas) that are ‘frankly 
dysfunctional’.16 Among the ailments of the bottom third are: 
 
endemic corruption, and poor financial management leading to continuous negative audit 
outcomes. There is a poor record of service delivery, and functions such as fixing potholes, 
collecting refuse, maintaining public places or fixing street lights are not performed. 
While most of the necessary resources to render the functions or maintain the systems are 
available, the basic mechanisms to perform these functions are often not in place. It is in 
these municipalities that we are failing our people dramatically, and where we need to be 
intervening urgently in order to correct the decay in the system.17 
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15 Ibid at 19. 
16 Back to Basics (note 1 above) at 4. 




A further concern identified was the viability of certain municipalities: ‘The low rate of 
collection of revenue continues to undermine the ability of municipalities to deliver services 
to communities.’18 Over the past decade and a half, the response of the national 
government to these challenges has been two-fold: first, a persistent drive to continuously 
tighten the legislative framework for municipalities, and second, a series of support 
programmes. The first strategy is based on the vain belief that systemic problems can be 
legislated out of existence, whereas, in fact, the more regulation was poured over local 
government, the greater the lawlessness that ensued.19 The second response, namely large 
scale support programmes, such as ‘Project Consolidate’ and ‘Siyenza Manje’ could resolve 
immediate problems but not systemic ones. Provinces, bearing the responsibility of 
monitoring, supporting, and if need be intervening in failed municipalities,20 were often 
incapable of doing so effectively.21 
 
The state of local government that the Constitutional Court confronts is thus comprised of: 
municipalities, large and small, that are performing well and can do more; most 
municipalities that are financially vulnerable as they must collect the bulk of their revenue; 
and dysfunctional municipalities which are not accountable to the residents they serve. 
 
III empowering Local government to control the local 
space 
The first judgment, Lagoonbay, falls in the first category, namely a dispute about local 
government’s constitutional powers and the Court’s role in strengthening local government 
by protecting these powers. It is part of a series of four Constitutional Court judgments 
dealing with the delineation of municipal powers over land use planning. In terms of the 
Constitution ‘municipal planning’ is a municipal competence,22  a matter over which the 
national and provincial governments have only limited regulatory powers in terms of s 
155(7).23 It is useful to provide a brief overview of the other three cases because this ‘quartet’ 
of judgments, of which Lagoonbay is part, signals a firm and consistent trend on municipal 
powers. 
 
The first judgment in the series was handed down in 2010 when the Court struck down parts of 
the Development Facilitation Act.24 The City of Johannesburg had taken issue with 
provincial tribunals rezoning land and deciding on the establishment of 
townships/subdivision of land in its jurisdiction. It argued that these powers fell within its 
constitutional competency for ‘municipal planning’ and that provinces could not usurp those 
powers. In Gauteng Development Tribunal, the Court agreed and struck down those parts of 
the DFA that established and empowered the provincial tribunals to rezone land and decide on 
                                                          
18 Ibid at 5. 
19 N Steytler ‘The Strangulation of Local Government’ (2008) Journal of South African Law 518. 
20 See N Steytler & J de Visser Local Government Law of South Africa (2013) Chapter 15. 
21 State of Local Government Report (note 13 above) at 17. 
22 Constitution ss 156(1) and (2) read with Schedule 4B. 
23 On the ambit of the national and provincial governments’ regulatory powers, see Steytler & De Visser (note 20 above) at 24(11) – 
24(13). 




the establishment of townships/subdivision of erven.25 This was a victory for municipal 
autonomy and cast doubt over the strong role hitherto played by provinces in land use 
planning matters. Many provinces, the Western Cape included, saw their powers to 
discourage inappropriate development and encourage appropriate development diminishing. 
 
The second judgment, Maccsand,26 was handed down in 2012 and built on the precedent set 
by Gauteng Development Tribunal. The question was whether the fact that a mining 
company had obtained a mining license obviated the need for it to obtain municipal land 
use approvals in terms of the Western Cape’s Land Use Planning Ordinance.27 The mining 
company, supported by the national Minister of Minerals and Energy argued that the 
granting of a mining license trumps municipal authority over ‘municipal planning’: 
otherwise national government’s exclusive authority over mining would be usurped by the 
municipality. The Court dismissed this approach with the simple argument that ‘LUPO 
regulates the use of land and not mining’.28 Maccsand was an important marker in the 
development of a better understanding of the division of powers between spheres of 
government. The fact that a particular activity, regulated by local government, attracts 
the legislative attention of further spheres of government is not constitutionally 
problematic. 
 
In Lagoonbay, the province pursued its case from a different angle (and achieved partial 
success). The dispute revolved around a development in the jurisdiction of George 
Municipality. The development included two golf courses, a hotel, a private park and a gated 
residential community. It was, by all accounts, controversial and its impact stretched 
beyond the boundaries of George. The case revolves around various planning instruments, 
the detail of which is not discussed here. But the crux is this: on the basis of certain 
provisions of LUPO, the MEC had reserved for herself the right to approve the rezoning and 
subdivision that were necessary to make the development happen. The argument was that 
‘the location and impact of the proposed development constitutes “Regional and Provincial 
Planning”’, not ‘municipal planning’.29 The municipality approved the subsequent application 
for rezoning and subdivision but also referred the matter to the MEC. The MEC refused 
the application. That decision was challenged by the developer who wanted the Court to 
declare that the municipality’s approval was sufficient to proceed with the development. The 
developer argued, on the basis of Gauteng Development Tribunal that only municipalities 
may decide on rezoning and subdivision. They furthermore argued, with reference to CDA 
Boerdery (Edms) Bpk and Others v The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and 
Others,30 that the sections of LUPO relied upon by the MEC were impliedly repealed with 
the coming into operation of the Constitution. 
 
                                                          
25 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others [2010] ZACC 11, 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC), 2010 (9) BCLR 859 (CC)(‘Gauteng Development Tribunal’). 
26 Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others [2012] ZACC 7, 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC), 2012 (7) BCLR 690 (CC)(‘Maccsand’). 
27 15 of 1985 (LUPO). 
28 Maccsand (note 26 above) at para 47. 
29 Lagoonbay (note 2 above) at para 4. ‘Regional planning and development’ is a Schedule 4A functional area, while ‘provincial 
planning’ is an exclusive Schedule 5A functional area. 




In response, the MEC accepted that, in a large majority of cases, municipalities must consider 
land use applications as their impact is limited to the geographical area of the municipality. 
However, he argued that there is a category of planning decisions which have an impact 
beyond the area of a single municipality and that therefore fall within the ambit of ‘provincial 
planning’ and/or ‘regional planning and development’ as contained in Part A of Schedules 4 
and 5 of the Constitution. The MEC’s argument was accepted in the Western Cape High 
Court.31 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed and held that the rezoning was 
a matter for the municipality, not the provincial government. It based this on an 
understanding of zoning schemes as an instrument ‘to determine use rights and to provide 
for control over use rights and over the utilisation of the land in the area of jurisdiction of a 
local authority’.32 
 
The scene was thus set for a constitutional argument on the reach of the municipality’s  
constitutional  authority  with  regard  to  ‘municipal  planning’ and provincial powers with 
regard to the same functional area. However, the constitutional argument fell flat as the 
developer – Lagoonbay – did not attack the provisions of LUPO the MEC relied upon. 
Instead, it argued that these sections had been ‘impliedly repealed’ by s 8 of the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act33 and s 83(1) of the Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act34 because these provisions no longer empower provinces to rezone and 
subdivide. The Constitutional Court did not accept this argument because these Acts do 
little more than restate the Constitution. They do not provide for any alternative for the 
intricate and critically important scheme set forth by LUPO and there is no neatly identifiable 
provision that can be removed to address the unconstitutionality. 
 
Because the MEC’s actions were based on unchallenged provisions of LUPO the Court was 
thus forced to limit its enquiry to the question as to whether the MEC acted ultra vires 
LUPO.35 In essence, the judgment emphasises the rule of law. A validly enacted provincial 
law remains valid until set aside by the Constitutional Court. Decisions taken in terms of 
those laws are valid, no matter how incompatible they may be with the Constitution. This is 
different only if the decision itself is ultra vires the empowering law. 
 
However, the Court did confess that it was tempted to follow the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in setting aside the MEC’s conduct.36 It even elaborated, in five neat points, what its 
argument would have been (had it succumbed to that temptation). First, national and 
provincial spheres are, in principle, not entitled to usurp the functions of local government. 
Secondly, the constitutional vision of autonomous spheres of government  must  be  
preserved.  Thirdly, while the Constitution confers planning responsibilities on each of 
the spheres of government, those are different planning responsibilities, based on ‘what 
                                                          
31 Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the 
Western Cape and Others [2011] ZAWCHC 327, [2011] 4 All SA 270 (WCC). 
32 Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v The Minister for Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the 
Western Cape & Others [2013] ZASCA 13 at para 8. 
33 Act 32 of 2000. 
34 Act 117 of 1998. 
35 Lagoonbay (note 2 above) at para 45. 




is appropriate to each sphere’. Fourthly, ‘“planning” in the context of municipal affairs is a 
term which has assumed a particular, well-established meaning which includes the zoning 
of land and the establishment of townships’. Lastly, the provincial competence for ‘urban 
and rural development’ is not wide enough to include powers that form part of ‘municipal 
planning’.37 These factors led the Court to the compelling (but inconsequential) conclusion 
that ‘there is therefore a strong case for concluding that, under the Constitution, the 
Provincial Minister was not competent to refuse the rezoning and subdivision applications’.38 
 
Number four of the quartet of Constitutional Court judgments on municipal powers in land 
use planning was decided in 2014 but deserves consideration as it is the judgment in which 
the Court could complete the reasoning which it was forced to abandon in Lagoonbay. 
Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western 
Cape v The Habitat Council and Others39 dealt with the constitutionality of s 44 of LUPO, 
which provided that persons aggrieved by a land use control decision taken by a 
municipality, may appeal to the Premier who considers the appeal and may replace the 
municipal decision with his or her own decision regardless of the nature or scale of the 
development. The Court held that s 44 was unconstitutional: ‘The provincial appellate 
capability impermissibly usurps the power of local authorities to manage “municipal 
planning”, intrudes on the autonomous sphere of authority the Constitution accords to 
municipalities, and fails to recognise the distinctiveness of the municipal sphere.’40 
 
The MEC had urged the Constitutional Court to retain the provincial appeal authority in 
cases where the development has an impact beyond the municipality’s boundary. The MEC’s 
first argument was that without the provincial executive’s ‘surveillance’, the provincial 
government would be powerless to stop big decisions with extra-municipal effects. The 
Court, with reference to Maccsands, did not accept this argument. No matter how big the 
development, provinces must use powers of their own to stop the undesirable ones instead of 
relying on a power to reverse municipal decisions.41 
 
The second argument was that s 155(7) of the Constitution permits the provincial 
government to exercise oversight over municipalities and thus permits provinces to hear 
appeals against municipal decisions. The Constitutional Court disagreed. It held that s 
155(7) does not permit the usurpation of the power or the performance of the function 
itself, but allows the provincial government to determine norms and guidelines. Thirdly, the 
MEC argued that the appeal power enables the provincial government to protect provincial 
interests as otherwise ‘parochial municipal interests will triumph’.42 To this, the Court 
responded tersely by stating that the Constitution intends for those ‘parochial interests’ to 
prevail in subdivision and zoning decisions ‘subject only to the oversight and support role 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
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39 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat Council and Others; 
Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v City of Cape Town and Others 
[2014] ZACC 9, 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC), 2014 (5) BCLR 591 (CC)(‘Habitat Council’). 
40 Ibid at para 13 (footnotes omitted). 
41 Ibid at paras 20–22. 




of national and provincial government, and to the planning powers vested in them’.43 Section 
44 of LUPO was thus declared unconstitutional in its entirety. 
 
The quartet of Constitutional Court decisions, with Lagoonbay as the awkward middle one, 
establishes a firm and consistent trend on municipal powers, most eloquently expressed in 
the Court’s five-point confession in Lagoonbay. Turning the attention back to the overall 
theme of this article – the Court being confronted with both assertive, capable local 
governments as well as with dysfunctional ones – it is telling that in all of these cases, the 
charge against national and provincial government’s tight-fisted approach was led by 
municipalities in the top third of Minister Gordhan’s categorisation. In three of the four 
cases, a metropolitan municipality asserted its authority and in Lagoonbay the authority of 
a secondary city, namely George Municipality, was vindicated. 
 
The consequence of the quartet of cases is that all municipalities, still under the yoke of 
provincial ordinances or old order national legislation, are given expansive scope in the 
field of planning. It is also a further indicator that the Court is generous in its 
interpretation of local powers. The result is that both highly functional urban 
municipalities, facilitating large developments, and dysfunctional rural municipalities 
benefit from the Court’s approach. Put differently, the mere fact that dysfunctional 
municipalities may not be able to exercise such ‘increased’ powers effectively or efficiently is 
no bar for empowering the able and the willing. 
 
Having increased powers is one thing; having the financial resources to exercise those 
powers productively is another. Moreover, if the exercise of powers is transmogrified in public 
obligations to provide basic services, the powers to levy and collect property rates are 
crucial. 
 
IV   extracting revenue 
Local governments find themselves in a precarious financial position. They are reliant on 
raising their own revenue for the bulk of their expenditure. For the 2013/14 financial year 
they collectively raised 73 per cent of their revenue, the rest coming from transfers in the form 
of an equitable share and conditional grants.44 This figure, of course, masks the great 
disparities between local governments. The eight metropolitan municipalities raised 83 per 
cent of their revenue, while the 70 most rural municipalities were reliant on transfers for 73 
per cent of their revenue.45 This disparity is the result of the differing economic contexts in 
which the municipalities apply their power to impose property rates and charge user fees for 
water and electricity, their main revenue sources. 
 
The strength of local government autonomy, and ostensibly the pillar of its democratic 
accountability, is the fact that the majority of municipalities raise and collect the bulk of 
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their own income. This creates a special relationship with their ratepayers and customers. 
However, collecting revenue has not been easy. Aggregate municipal consumer debts were 
R98 billion as at 30 September 2014.46 As noted, the failure to collect sufficient revenue 
threatens the sustainability of many municipalities. It is this backdrop that makes 
Liebenberg and Ingonyama Trust particularly important. Both judgments deal with the 
imposition of property taxes, a key source of income for local government. Prior to the 
ushering in of the new local government dispensation in 2000, rural land owners were not 
required to pay property rates. The introduction of wall-to-wall municipalities placed the 
entire country under local democracy, and, one has to hasten to say, all land owners under 
the obligation to pay property taxes. Two groups of rural land owners had previously fallen 
outside the reach of property rates – private agricultural land and communal land, the one 
historically white and wealthy, the other black and impoverished. 
 
A   Empowering Municipalities to Collect Rates 
In Liebenberg,47 land owning farmers in the rich wheat farming district of the Swartland 
protested against having to pay property rates when they were first introduced by the 
Bergrivier Municipality in 2001. They refused to pay for the following eight years. This was 
a case of ratepayers that could pay, but did not want to in the context of a reasonably 
performing municipality,48 against which no complaints about the quality of services or 
governance were levelled. 
 
As both the Constitution and the local government legislation empowered municipalities 
to levy rates on all properties, the disgruntled farmers’ legal focus was limited to 
procedural challenges – the levying of property rates was irregularly done, first in terms of 
the Local Government Transition Act,49 the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act,50 and then the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act.51 Of 
course, the  farmers  (or rather their lawyers) had a field day. The laws are replete with 
detailed rules to municipalities on how to levy rates, how to be participatory as much as 
possible. These detailed rules are termed by Geoff Budlender as ‘trip wires’;52 a municipality is 
bound to trip up on one or other of the requirements in the relevant legislation. 
 
The farmers complained, among others matters, about the following: 
 
                                                          
46 National Treasury Local Government Revenue and Expenditure: First Quarter Local Government - Section 71 Report for the period: 
1 July 2014 – 30 September 2014 (5 December 2014) 2, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2015/2015061501%20-%20Press%20Release%20S71.pdf. 
47 Liebenberg (note 3 above). 
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Municipality is reasonably well-governed. The Auditor-General pointed out that the municipality had improved on its performance 
compared to the previous financial year. Auditor-General General Report on the Audit Outcomes of Local Government 2012-13 – 
Western Cape (2013) 143. 
49 Act 209 of 1993 (LGTA). 
50 Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA). 
51 Act 4 of 2004 (Rates Act). 




a) During the 2002/3 financial year, the Municipality failed to publicly give notice of its 
rates resolution as required by s 10G(7)(d)(ii) of the LGTA; 
b) For the 2004/5 to 2008/9 financial years the municipality did not display a notice 
stating the ‘general purport’ of the rates resolution, including the rebate for farmers (as 
required by s 10G(7)(c)(ii) of the LGTA; 
c) For the 2005/6 to 2008/9 financial years, the notice published on the rates resolution 
omitted to state that objections could be lodged within 14 days as required by s 
10G(7)(c)(iv) of the LGTA, but not required by the MFMA; 
d) For the 2006/7 to 2008/9 financial years, the rates resolution was not published in 
the Provincial Gazette as required by s 14(2) of the Rates Act. 
 
In the end, the issues were (a) which rules applied; and (b) how the courts should deal with 
non-compliance of the specific applicable rules. On both scores the majority opinion of the 
Court, penned by Mhlantla AJ, came out strongly in favour of the Municipality, 
interpreting the law purposively to give local government maximum leverage over unwilling 
ratepayers. 
 
1   Which Rules Applied? 
The LGTA, by its very transitional nature, was the most accommodating for 
municipalities. During the transitional phase; it imposed the least demanding publication 
requirements on municipalities. The Rates Act, giving effect to s 229(2)(b) of the 
Constitution, is more demanding, setting specific requirements for public notification and 
participation. The first issue to be decided was whether s 10G(7) of the LGTA, which was 
repealed by s 179 of the MFMA, but kept alive as a transitional provision, was finally 
extinguished by the enactment of the Rates Act, or only when this Act’s transitional 
provisions lapsed on 30 June 2011. 
 
On this score the Court split. A plain reading of s 179 of the MFMA would have meant that 
the enactment of the Rates Act finally meant the death knell of s 10G(7) (and success for the 
farmers), while a broad construction, which would not strain the text too far, would keep s 
10G(7) of the LGTA alive (and the municipality in business). The latter route was chosen, 
because Mhlantla AJ held that the purpose of the Rates Act should not only be ascertained 
from its own provisions, but also from ‘the broader context within which it was passed and 
the relationship between the various statutory enactments that have sought to restructure 
local government’.53 The Municipality could thus rely on the LGTA to excuse its failure to 
publish the rates resolution in the Provincial Gazette as required by s 14(2) of the Rates Act. 
Even where the LGTA imposed a burden, such as that the published notice must state that 
objections could be lodged within 14 days of the publication, the Municipality could rely on 
the MFMA, which had no such requirement.54 The import is clear; an interpretation that 
empowers municipalities to levy rates should be preferred above one that impedes 
municipalities, at least in the transitional phase. 
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The background to this is that the LGTA was the legislated outcome of the multiparty 
negotiations on the future of local government in post-apartheid South Africa. It 
regulated the complicated transformation of the fragmented and illegitimate system of 
Apartheid local government into a system that aligns with the new constitutional order. 
Importantly, it sought to do so without major disruption to existing systems and services. 
The Court emphasises that the LGTA had a specific purpose, namely to afford local 
government time to develop new rating systems. The Court, while lightly annoyed with the 
poorly worded transitional provisions, thus displayed understanding with regard to the 
complexity of the local government transformation and protected local government’s 
revenue stream as an essential platform from which to exercise a developmental mandate. 
 
2   Impact of Non-compliance with the Rules? 
The second battery of arguments, launched by the farmers, was essentially a series of 
procedural flaws on the basis of which they sought to have the imposition of property 
rates set aside. The Court considered these arguments against the backdrop of a general 
approach to assessing a municipality’s compliance with statutory prescripts, namely: 
 
[A] failure by a municipality to comply with relevant statutory provisions does not 
necessarily lead to the actions under scrutiny being rendered invalid. The question is 
whether there has been substantial compliance, taking into account the relevant statutory 
provisions in particular and the legislative scheme as a whole.55 
 
Even when the less demanding rules of the LGTA applied, the failure to apply them 
scrupulously did not necessarily invalidate the imposition of rates. Writing for the majority 
Mhlantla AJ first quoted, with approval, the Court’s earlier holding in African Christian 
Democratic Party v Electoral Commission, that ‘the question is whether the steps taken by 
the local authority are effective when measured against the object of the Legislature, 
which is ascertained from the language, scope and purpose of the enactment as a whole 
and the statutory requirement in particular’.56 With reference to a matter where property 
rates was in issue, she quoted with approval the following SCA dictum: ‘To nullify the revenue 
stream of a local authority merely because of an administrative hiccup appears to me to be so 
drastic a result that it is unlikely that the Legislature could have intended it’.57 
 
Consequently, the fact that the Municipality failed to publicly give notice of its rates 
resolution as required by s 10G(7)(d)(ii) of the LGTA, was not material. The Municipality 
went through a public participation process and was responsive thereto, and these measures 
were ‘substantially effective in achieving the objects of s 10G(7) in particular and the 
legislative scheme as a whole’.58 The complaint that the public notice stating the ‘general 
purport’ of the rates resolution, did not including the rebate for farmers (as required by s 
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10G(7)(c)(ii) of the LGTA) was also dismissed, as the notice said that details of the resolution 
were available for inspection.59 
 
The motivation for this very accommodating approach to local government need not be a 
question for speculation as the Court provided it in clear terms in the final two paragraphs of 
the judgment: municipalities are largely self-reliant and those who can pay should do so. 
Mhlantla AJ referred to the early Constitutional Court decision in Pretoria City Council v 
Walker, in which Langa DP wrote that ‘[a] culture of self-help in which people refuse to pay 
for services they have received is not acceptable’.60 She then continued: 
 
Effective cooperation between citizens and government at local level is a foundational 
building block of our democracy. The State must of course uphold the rule of law and 
ensure its obligations are discharged. But, at the same time the culture of non-payment for 
municipal services has, as this Court has said before, “no place in a constitutional State in 
which the rights of all persons are guaranteed and all have access to the courts to protect 
their rights.”61 
 
The Liebenberg judgment is thus a further example of the Court coming down on the side 
of local government, helping it not to stumble over the ‘tripwires’ designed by a zealous 
national government and used by farmers reluctant to pay local government taxes. 
 
While the outcome is surely correct – not every hiccup should invalidate a revenue raising 
measure – it does raise questions of legal certainty and the faithful adherence to the principle 
of legality. Khampepe J in her minority judgment gave a stirring defence of the principle: 
 
Where the State purports to extract taxes from its citizens – conduct that goes to the very 
heart of the social contract between government and its people – that extraction must be 
done in a lawful manner. Where a local authority purports to impose rates, that imposition 
must be done in accordance with the constraints that Parliament has imposed. If we are to 
give cognisance to the fact that the Constitution now empowers municipalities to exercise 
original legislative powers, we must also accept that municipal authorities may no longer 
adopt an informal approach to the exercise of their powers.62 
 
One cannot but agree with her sentiment that ‘the principle of legality [lies] at the heart of 
our modern constitutional dispensation’.63 The problem remains, however, that of over-
prescription by the legislature.64 Every ‘must’ – and there are hundreds of them scattered 
throughout the suite of local government legislation – cannot render local administrative 
decisions vulnerable to procedural challenges with potentially grave consequences for 
municipalities. In its eagerness to ensure the correct and desirable process, the legislator 
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has often overreached its aim. The courts, not wanting to see dire financial consequences 
for the municipality will on a case by case basis ‘rewrite’ the statute book for what is 
reasonable in a particular set of circumstances. 
 
As noted above, sustainable financial resources lie at the heart of a well- functioning 
municipality that delivers services. In the transition phase of local government, 
municipalities – particularly in rural areas where the skills base is uneven – have 
struggled to find their way through the thicket of the evolving financial legislation that 
has increased in density. In Liebenberg the Court accommodated municipalities by 
applying a soft approach to regulatory compliance, an approach from which struggling 
municipalities would derive the most benefit. However, it is on this very point that the Court 
split. It will always be a difficult path to tread between, on the one side, protecting 
municipalities from getting routinely tripped up, and, on the other side, weakening adherence 
to the rule of law. The majority’s approach of requiring substantial compliance with the 
policy purpose of the legislative requirements is appropriate; it is doubtful whether the 
skills capacity of a municipality to comply with the requirements should be a relevant 
factor at all. 
 
B   (Retrospective) rating of communal land 
There are, however, limits to the Court’s willingness to accommodate municipalities’ 
need to spread the tax net as wide as possible. In Ingonyama Trust65 the Court dealt with a 
complainant from the other end of the spectrum from that of private landowners, namely the 
owners of communal land in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
These areas fell outside the formal structures of local governance during the apartheid 
era. The local government transformation, culminating in 2000 when a ‘wall-to-wall’ 
system of local government was established, brought this category of land under the 
jurisdiction of municipalities’ rates regimes. 
 
In Ingonyama Trust, the metropolitan municipality approached the High Court in 2009 for 
a declaratory order that the communal land held in trust by the Ingonyama Trust, which 
fell within the boundaries of the municipality, was rateable land as from May 1996, when 
the first election of transitional councils were held, until June 2005 when the Rates Act 
came into force. The Rates Act also repealed the Rating of State Property Act,66 which 
exempted state land from rates. The question was whether the Rating Act applied to the 
land held by the Ingonyama Trust from 1996 to June 2005. The High Court held that it did 
not, making the trust land subject to rates, a decision that was reversed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal.67 
 
In refusing the Municipality leave to appeal because there were no prospects for success, 
the Constitutional Court confirmed the SCA decision that the land held by the Trust 
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was state property within the meaning of the Act and the Constitution and thus exempt 
from property taxes. In refusing leave, the Court also said that ‘it would not ordinarily be 
in the interests of justice for a municipality to be allowed to levy rates on immovable 
property, dating back eight to 17 years, without any explanation for its failure to do so 
within the relevant financial years’.68 In passing the Court laid down a general principle 
against the retrospective levying of rates: ‘An underlying principle regarding the levying of 
rates is that they must be levied within the financial year in respect of which the rates are 
charged.’69 Jafta J advanced the following reasons for this rule. Firstly, a property owner 
would find it difficult to dispute the valuation of the rated property, years after the event. 
Secondly, as an increase in rates is bound up in the municipal budget, and the need for 
public notification and participation, the retrospective levying of rates would circumvent 
such processes.70 One could further add the reason for notification of the rates resolution, 
namely, ratepayers must be informed in advance about their rates liability so that they can 
manage their financial affairs accordingly. 
 
This decision does not fly in the face of the Court’s general supportive approach of 
strengthening and protecting municipal revenue raising powers. The Court will, however, 
not tolerate egregious transgressions of basic legal precepts such as the rule against 
retrospectivity. 
 
V extracting accountability for expenditure 
From a democratic theory perspective, the link between taxes and democracy was forged 
at the Boston Tea Party on 16 December 1773 with the demand: ‘No taxation without 
representation’. It is fundamentally unfair to pay taxes with no control over expenditure 
decisions on the tax revenue so raised. Thus a fundamental notion of democratic 
governance was established. The raising and spending of revenue is the prerogative of 
the elected government. The Constitutional Court, in the celebrated case of Fedsure Life 
Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and 
Others,71 held that the adoption of a municipal budget and revenue-raising measure is a 
legislative act and thus not subject to administrative review. 
 
This logic also establishes a fundamental democratic accountability relationship between  the  
elected  representatives  and  the  electorate.  Where  an  elected government extracts hard-
earned money from its citizens, the latter has every incentive to hold the elected 
government accountable for the purpose and manner in which the taxpayers’ money is spent. 
Dissatisfaction about expenditure decision should, theoretically at least, lead to the 
withdrawal of the political mandate of the elected government at the next election. However, 
the five yearly disapproval rating is insufficient in modern democracies; a continuous 
engagement in decision making has become part and parcel of the modern concept of 
participatory democracy. As noted above, the Constitutional Court has confirmed that this 
                                                          
68 Ingonyama Trust (note 4 above) at para 41. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid at paras 41–42. 
71 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others [1998] ZACC 17, 




principle underpins the Constitution and informs local governance. The Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act requires residents’ participation in the key 
decisions of the municipal council, the MFMA demands participation in the budgeting 
process, and the Rates Act in the levying of rates, all statutory provision that have been 
given effect to by the courts.72 The requirements of consultation with residents have not 
resulted on the whole in a satisfied citizenry, as evidenced by numerous cases where residents 
claim that municipalities did not act in a transparent or accountable manner. In 2013, the 
Constitutional Court was confronted with two such cases where it had to carefully assess 
whether the municipalities’ conduct could withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
 
A   Constitutional Duty to Account? 
In Brittania Beach v Saldanha Bay Municipality73 a group of developers unsuccessfully tried 
to employ the principle of accountability to extract an account from the municipality in 
respect of certain sums they alleged were overpaid. They failed, not because the Court did 
not accept democratic accountability but rather because they leapfrogged the applicable 
statutory instruments to extract accountability and instead wanted to rely directly on 
constitutional principles. The payments were capital contributions, levied as conditions to 
land use approvals. By the time the issue reached the Constitutional Court, the better part of 
the dispute had been resolved by the Supreme Court of Appeal’s ruling that the capital 
contributions were validly imposed.74 The developers still argued, however, that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal overlooked the fact that a constitutional duty to account rests on the 
municipality on the basis of s 195 of the Constitution, containing the basic values and 
principles of public administration. 
 
However, the Constitutional Court held that these do not give rise to independent rights and that 
the Constitution, statutes, and court proceedings provide specific rights and remedies that 
could have been pursued. Since the claim for a duty to account was not located within any 
statutory framework, it failed. The outcome may have been different, had the claim been 
based on a specific statutory remedy, such as a request for access to information in terms of 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act75 or a claim based on the provisions of the 
Municipal Systems Act. There is a clear echo of Lagoonbay, where the Court refused to leapfrog 
LUPO despite its dubious constitutional status. Constitutional arguments that overlook the 
existence of relevant and applicable statutory instruments are unlikely to face a generous 
Constitutional Court. 
 
The Court also held that a duty to account does not arise as a result of a fiduciary 
relationship between citizens and the municipality. The fiduciary relationship, so the Court 
reasoned, ‘is a far cry from democratic accountability’.76 This is important in the context of 
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Rademan (discussed below), another judgment where the rules of contract were invoked to 
resolve disagreement between the municipality and its residents. 
 
On the face of it, the Court merely applied the general rule that litigants must first 
resort to the specific rules, in this case to foster accountability, before seeking support in the 
Constitution. The question that Rademan indirectly posed was much more profound: what 
are the remedies when the usual rules of ensuring accountability and proper government 
fail, and the municipality fails to meet its basic mandate of general service delivery, as 
one third of (dysfunctional) municipalities routinely do? 
 
B   What is the Remedy when Local Government Fails? 
Unresponsive or dysfunctional municipalities have evoked two sorts of protests, each 
coming from the polar sides of South Africa’s class and race divide. In the townships – 
occupied almost exclusively by black people – ‘service delivery protests’ by the 
impoverished have increased over the years both in numbers and violence.77 The majority 
of protests occurred in the better performing top third of municipalities – mainly in the 
metros.78 However, a substantial number occurred in the dysfunctional third. Significantly, 
protest action has had no link with political choices. High levels of service delivery protests 
did not translate into any significant shifts in political support. This has been explained by 
the fact that protests focus on service delivery matters, while elections are still conducted 
along the politics of identity.79 
 
On the other side of the race and class divide have been protests by mainly white 
ratepayers associations in the form of withholding property rates payments. A 2010 study of 
five municipalities found that there were genuine service delivery problems that prompted 
the withholding of rates and that these grievances were attributed to real or perceived 
incapacity, maladministration and corruption in the municipality.80 These views were 
shored up by the Auditor-General’s reports that revealed actual problems in financial 
management. Although the financial impact of the withholding was limited (less than 
R10 million was withheld nation-wide with half of that located in three municipalities), the 
political impact was substantial as it played into historical divisions and racial stereotypes. 
 
The constitutionality of this form of protest action eventually reached the Constitutional 
Court in Rademan v Moqhaka Municipality.81 Moqhaka Municipality, one of the five 
municipalities in the abovementioned study, should by all measures be a viable and effective 
municipality; with Kroonstad it has a large agricultural town at its core and a productive 
agricultural sector in the surrounding areas. Yet, on governance indicators it has done 
very poorly. It has collected eight successive disclaimers over the past years, that is, the 
Auditor-General could not conduct an audit of its financial statements in order to express 
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an opinion.82 Such was the state of a deeply troubled governance situation. For example, 
during the 2011-2012 financial year, R52 million of the Municipality’s expenditure was 
unauthorised, R111 million was irregular expenditure and R13 million was fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure. The Auditor-General issued a disclaimer and attributed the problems 
to three reasons: (1) key positions being vacant or key officials lacking competencies; (2) 
lack of consequences for poor performance; and (3) slow response by politicians in 
addressing root causes.83 In 2012-2013, the Municipality made little progress, causing the 
Auditor-General to comment that the Municipality is ‘stagnating’.84 
 
Ms Rademan decided to withhold the payment of rates because, euphemistically put, ‘she was 
unhappy about what she regarded as poor or inefficient service delivery by the 
Municipality’.85 She continued, however, to pay her electricity account, a strategy followed 
by other members of the Moqhaka Ratepayers and Residents’ Association. The Municipality 
in response proceeded, after notification, to cut off her electricity supply, which prompted 
Rademan to turn to the courts for its restoration. Before the Kroonstad Magistrate’s Court 
she argued: (a) the disconnection should be preceded by a court order; (b) she was not in 
arrears with her electricity account; and (c) not one of the conditions allowing disconnection in 
terms of the Electricity Regulation Act86 was present. Her success in obtaining a court order 
for the restoration of the electricity supply was short-lived as the Free State High Court 
upheld the Municipality’s appeal. Rademan pursued the matter further in Bloemfontein, but 
the Supreme Court of Appeal was not moved.87 It affirmed that no prior court order is 
required by the Municipal Systems Act for a disconnection. The court’s pragmatic answer 
was that such a requirement would be both ‘unrealistic and untenable’.88 Given the extent of 
service delivery protests and demonstration across the country, and ratepayers withholding 
rates, the court observed that it would be impractical to approach a court before every 
termination of a service. Also, the Municipal Systems Act made provision in s 102 for the 
consolidation of accounts, meaning that a customer could not pick and choose which account 
to pay and which not. The court did not address the third argument – whether s 21(5) of the 
Electricity Regulation Act governed the matter. What is clear from the litigation is that none 
of the arguments addressed the core issue: could the withholding of taxes be a legitimate 
remedy for poor service delivery? 
 
Rademan was thus the test case for this form of protest. Although Rademan’s delay in lodging an 
appeal against the Supreme Court of Appeal decision was ‘excessive’ and the reason proffered 
for it ‘less than satisfactory’, the Constitutional Court condoned the late application.89 The 
main reason for doing so was the consent of the Municipality; it did so because of the matter 
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was ‘of great importance and interest to local government authorities throughout the 
country on which they need certainty’ which only the Constitutional Court could provide.90 
 
When Rademan was argued before the Constitutional Court only two arguments were 
raised. First, the electricity supply could not be cut off as she was not in arrears on the 
payment of her electricity account. The second was that the municipality’s power to cut off 
electricity supply was circumscribed by s 21(5) of the Electricity Regulation Act. On the 
first the Court held that s 102 of the Municipal Systems Act, as supplemented by the 
municipality’s by-law, gave the municipality the power to consolidate the accounts of a 
consumer. The effect of such a consolidation is that if only part of the account is paid, the 
consumer is in breach of his or her obligation to pay and enforcement measures can be 
applied. On the second ground the Court confirmed the decisions of the courts a quo. 
Section 21(5)(c) of the Electricity Regulation Act allows the termination of the supply of 
electricity if the consumer contravened the conditions of payment set by the municipality, 
including the consolidation of accounts and the termination of services in the event of being 
in arrears.91 Froneman J argued, in our view correctly, that the Electricity Regulation Act 
was not applicable to the case at all as it deals with the supply of electricity and not with 
the payment of rates.92 The matter should be resolved in terms of the Municipal Systems 
Act and the municipality’s by-laws. 
 
The Court’s resolution of these issues did not break new ground. The issue of electricity 
(and even water) disconnections has been litigated extensively over the years.93 The legal 
edifice of extracting payments of rates and other charges through the threat of electricity 
disconnection has been made watertight. Section 102 of the Municipal Systems Act allows for 
the consolidation of accounts. The provisions of s 102(2) of that Act, dealing with the 
suspension of payment due to a dispute, applies only when actual amounts due are 
contested. Municipalities must, however, enact by-laws to operationalise this power. The 
details of the Moqhaka Municipality’s by-laws and agreement with electricity consumers 
attest to the concerted effort to make sure that any attempt of escaping the payment of rates is 
thwarted. 
 
The legal skirmishes about the application of the Municipal Systems Act or the Electricity 
Regulation Act and municipal by-laws and agreements were merely diversionary legal 
strategies and issues. The real issue, also aired before the Court, was the vexed question 
as to what is ‘the remedy of a resident or ratepayer … where the municipality demands 
payment for a service or for services in circumstances where the municipality has not 
provided the service or services’.94 The municipality’s short answer was that a dissatisfied 
consumer must approach a court for a declaratory order that the service or services be 
rendered. Zondi J was of the view that Rademan’s case was not that ‘the Municipality 
claimed payment for services that it had not rendered. Indeed, in the present matter it has not 
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been proved that the Municipality was claiming payment for services that had been 
rendered poorly or inefficiently’.95 This view is rather surprising because it was indeed 
Rademan’s case in the Magistrate’s Court that she was withholding rates because of poor 
services.96 However, Zondo J rose to the hypothetical challenge as follows: 
 
[W]here a municipality claims payment from a resident or ratepayer for services, it is 
only entitled to payment for services that it has rendered. By the same token, where a 
municipality claims from a resident, customer or ratepayer payment for services, the 
resident, customer or ratepayer is only obliged to pay the municipality for services that 
have been rendered. There is no obligation on a resident, customer or ratepayer to pay the 
municipality for a service that has not been rendered. Accordingly, where, for example, a 
municipality included into an account for services an item for electricity when in fact no 
electricity has been connected to the particular property and, therefore no electricity has 
been supplied, the customer is entitled to take the stance that he or she will pay the total bill 
less the amount claimed for electricity supply97  
 
The example of electricity supply is not very helpful: no one disagrees that if no electricity 
is delivered, no payment obligation follows. It is a contractual relationship between a 
customer and a municipality for a ‘trading service’, that is, an individualised and 
measurable service. The real question is if general, non-individualised services are not 
delivered, or poorly delivered, could the rates that are meant to pay for such services, be 
withheld? Can the above dictum be used to also affirm a more general social contract? 
 
The Court refers to three specific categories of persons who may become liable for payments: 
residents, customers and ratepayers. Each of these categories of payers relates to one or 
other of a municipality’s revenue sources: trading services, rates and other regulatory 
payments such as licensing fees, penalties and the like. In the category ‘customers’ fall 
persons receiving individualised accounts for measurable services such as electricity, water, 
sanitation and waste removal. The category ‘residents’ probably refers to charges paid by 
individuals such as licensing fees. The reference to ‘ratepayers’ then deals with those services 
that the entire community benefits from, such as the maintenance of roads, stormwater 
systems, and street lighting, services which are usually funded by rates revenue. 
 
Although taxes are defined as payment of moneys not in return for any definite service, 
in the case of a municipality the link between property rates and generalised services is 
all too visible; they are used to finance the non-trading services, including road 
maintenance, street lighting, and cleaning. As the Minister of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs noted, it is the potholes in the roads, the uncollected garbage, the 
streetlights that do not work,98 that indicate that the rates are not appropriately used. The 
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question is whether Zondo J has opened the door slightly by introducing the principle of ‘no 
services no rates’? 
 
Implicit in the dictum is that where ratepayers can show that they are not receiving such 
community services, or if they are rendered ‘poorly of inefficiently’, there is no duty to pay rates. 
Of course, as the Court emphasised, no or poor service delivery must be clearly proved. The 
strong message that the Court implicitly delivered was that the duty to pay rates is not an 
absolute obligation, irrespective of whether or not any or poor services are delivered in 
return. The Court thus did not take up the municipality’s suggestion that the appropriate 
remedy for a municipality’s failure to provide services is to approach a court for a 
declaratory order. Instead the Court asserted the basic principle of contract. In the case of a 
trading service, the normal rules of contract apply. In the case of ratepayers, the imperative 
of the social contract governs: no rates without services. 
 
However, such an argument runs counter to a long line of decisions condemning ‘self-help’ 
measures. When the matter first came to the Constitutional Court in 1998, it involved 
residents from white suburbs in Pretoria withholding payments because of complaints about 
unfair discrimination in debt collection measures. Langa DP was forthright: withholding 
payments was a practice that had ‘no place in a constitutional state in which the rights of all 
persons are guaranteed and all have access to the courts to protect their rights’.99 He 
continued: 
 
Local government is an important tier of public administration as any. It has to continue 
functioning for the common good; it however cannot do so efficiently and effectively if 
every person who has a grievance about the conduct of a public official or a government 
structure were to take the law into their own hands or resort to self-help by withholding 
payment for services rendered. That conduct carries with it the potential for chaos and 
anarchy and can therefore not be appropriate. The kind of society envisaged in the 
Constitution implies also the exercise of responsibility towards the systems and structures of 
society. A culture of self-help in which people refuse to pay for services they have received 
is not acceptable. It is pre-eminently for the courts to grant appropriate relief against any 
public official, institution or government when there are grievances. It is not for the 
disgruntled individual to decide what the appropriate relief should be and to combine with 
others or take it upon himself or herself to punish the government structure by withholding 
payment which is due.100 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Constitutional Court in Liebenberg.101 The chaos that 
may follow on self-help in the form of withholding rates is undeniable. The question, 
however, remains: what are the remedies for desperate residents and ratepayers facing 
dysfunctional municipalities? In this regard the Rademan Court skirted the issue. It did 
not provide any set of principles or guidance, as it did in Lagoonbay where the key matter 
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was also not squarely before them, on how the Court may come to the assistance of residents 
at the end of their tether. 
 
So the question remains: what are the legal options? Could the provincial or national 
government be compelled to intervene on behalf of the residents? In terms of s 139 of the 
Constitution the provincial executive may intervene in a municipality when the latter 
cannot or does not perform its executive obligations. This is a discretionary power which 
places no obligation on the provincial executive.102 In numerous cases, where it is 
undisputable that executive obligations are not fulfilled, provincial executives have not 
assumed responsibilities for those obligations despite the fact that they are ‘necessary to 
maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards for the 
rendering of a service’.103 It must be arguable that circumstances of dysfunctionality should 
transform this power into an obligation. The very constitutional object of local government 
is ‘to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner’.104 
 
Both the national and provincial government are also under a constitutional obligation to 
‘support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to 
exercise their powers and perform their functions’.105 While this is a lesser measure than the 
intervention in terms of s 139 of the Constitution, it nevertheless requires measures to be 
taken. Furthermore, these measures are not only legislative. Would a court be willing to give 
an order to that effect? 
 
What is to be done when the national and provincial governments fail to act? The 
Constitutional Court has recognised in Joseph the rights of residents to basic municipal 
services and was willing to enforce it against a municipality.106 Residents should be able to 
argue that the right to basic municipal services includes the filling of potholes in roads, the 
cleaning of public spaces, and the fixing of street lights. They could further argue that they 
have a right to the provision of ‘accountable government’,107 including having auditable 
financial statements which enable the Auditor-General to find out whether or not residents’ 
taxes and paid fees were misspent or stolen. If self-help is not an option, a court should be 
willing to impose a structural interdict compelling a dysfunctional municipality to report on 
progress made with clearly set targets for better administration. 
 
vi  conclusion 
The state of local government presents particular challenges for the Constitutional Court. It 
is a state institution that, at the one end of the spectrum, constitutes effective government in 
the majority of metropolitan municipalities and secondary cities, playing a crucial role in 
the economic development and well-being of the country and addressing poverty. At the 
                                                          
102 MEC for Local Government, Mpumalanga v IMATU [2001] ZASCA 99, 2002 (1) SA 76 (SCA). 
103 Constitution s 139(1)(b)(i). 
104 Constitution s 152(1)(b). 
105 Constitution s 154(1). 
106 Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others [2009] ZACC 30, 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC), 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC). See also 
Steytler & De Visser (note 20 above) at 17–6. 




other end there are dysfunctional municipalities, operating outside the law having 
abandoned their basic service duties to their residents. For all the municipalities, whether 
from the top or bottom third, to perform their constitutionally enshrined developmental 
mandate they must (a) have the appropriate powers; (b) have access to sustainable financial 
resources; and (c) do so in a partnership of accountability with the communities they 
serve. 
 
The Court responded to the first two challenges in a forthright manner, while with 
respect to the third the outcome is not clear. First, the Court has been supportive of the 
incremental extension of local government powers over the local space. In Lagoonbay 
(followed up by Habitat Council in 2014) the Court continued its line of holdings, correctly 
asserting the powers of local government against provinces in the field of the built 
environment. 
 
Second, the Court has gone out of its way to ensure the sustainability of municipalities 
by asserting their access to their limited revenue resources. In Liebenberg the majority of 
the Court did so in two ways: first, it gave the most generous interpretation of the legal 
framework by rescuing the LGTA from oblivion, and giving the municipality the more 
municipal-friendly set of rules for collecting property rates. Second, it went soft on 
compliance requirements. Following a line of judgments dealing with similar situations, it 
did not require close compliance with legal framework. All that is required is substantial 
compliance.  This  approach  is  of  particular  significance  for  municipalities with weak 
administrations that are struggling to govern within a plethora of prescriptive rules. For 
the dissenting judges, this accommodating approach came at too high a cost, that of legality 
both in keeping the LGTA alive and being soft on compliance. We disagree with the dissent 
that the costs are too high. Although legal certainty is important, some sensible way must be 
found through the thicket of overregulation. 
 
It should be added that the Court was not overzealous in arming municipalities with every 
conceivable tax-extractive device. In Ingonyama Trust it was not willing to empower the 
eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality to levy property rates retrospectively. 
 
Third, the Court did not come out strongly in favour of the third element; the partnership of 
accountability of the municipality with its residents. In Britannia Beach the applicants failed 
to exact accountability (obtaining access to information), not because the Court rejected the 
notion of democratic accountability, which is enshrined in the Constitution, but because 
the applicants leapfrogged the applicable statutory instruments in their attempt. Using the 
statutory instruments may have brought joy to the developers. 
 
When a   complaining  ratepayer,  Ms  Rademan,  followed  the  statutory instruments 
route to hold the wayward municipality to account for its failure to provide services, she 
also failed. The simple reason was that the statutory instruments at her disposal could 
provide no remedy for her problem – the municipality’s failure to provide basic services 




issue was not pertinently argued, the Court did not provide any guidance on how the 
intractable problem of dysfunctionality is to be approached. In the absence of any statutory 
remedies, the only route to success is to go directly to the Constitution and seek to enforce the 
right to basic municipal services. Although the Court may have hinted that self-help is a 
possibility when services are not forthcoming, it is unlikely that avenue will find ultimate 
judicial sanction. The only other option is, relying directly on the Constitution, to fashion 
judicial remedies that may protect residents governed by dysfunctional municipalities. 
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